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Nietzsche's Gift, by Harold Alderman; pp. 184. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1977,
$13.50 cloth, $5.50 paper.
This is one of the first books in English (if not the only one) to take Nietzsche's mode of
writing as a serious key to his philosophical enterprise. The usual approach has been to describe
Nietzsche alternately as an aphoristic or bombastic writer from whose confused texts we may
abstract a number of provocative philosophical theses. Alderman's perspective rightly begins
with the realization that Nietzsche's writings issue from a complex reflection on the problematics
of philosophical communication itself. Nietzsche's Gift is mainly about what Nietzsche described
in Ecce Homo as the greatest gift mankind has yet received— Thus Spoke Zarathustra.
Alderman offers an analysis designed to show that "Zarathustra is . . . the teacher who teaches
the need to explore the full range of the human voice" (p. 173). This emphasis on the "human
voice" suggests both the strengths and limitations of his study. For Alderman, Zarathustra is one
whose speech explores the many modalities of speech—discourse sober and drunk, dialogue,
soliloquy, comedy and silence—in order to show us the possibility of a human articulation of the
philosophical spirit.
Zarathustra's commitment to a genuine plurality of discursive modes is appropriate, given
Nietzsche's skepticism about the possibility of an absolute and infallible speech. From this
perspective, Alderman develops a number of close and illuminating readings of parts of
Zarathustra. To my mind the best of these are the careful treatments of the Vorrede in which
Zarathustra is searching for a philosophical voice, and of Part IV in which Nietzsche stages
a "comedy of affirmation." Nietzsche himself expressed the desire to be read as carefully as
philologists read their favorite texts, and in these analyses Alderman not only comes close to
Nietzsche's ideal, but also succeeds in conveying the drama of ideas in a remarkably lucid style,
free of the jargon of any particular school of interpretation. He wears his scholarship with ease in
correctly taking issue with Heidegger's interpretation of Nietzsche (based on the Nachlass) as the
last blind protagonist in the tragic history of Western metaphysics. Instead he recognizes that
Nietzsche is already beyond this tradition, playfully celebrating his release from it. (Perhaps only
Harold Bloom could do justice to Heidegger's passion to turn Nietzsche into a mere precursor
and escape the threat of his mastery.)
Yet it seems to me that Alderman's emphasis on the "human voice" in Zarathustra gives
us a partial and somewhat tamed reading of Nietzsche's greatest work. By suggesting that
Nietzsche is ultimately interested in the possibility of a fully integrated human existence, this
reading downplays some of the deliberately paradoxical dimensions of Zarathustra. Let me
briefly outline an alternative. The doctrine of eternal recurrence is not only a metaphysical
paradox (combining the one and the many, fate and free will, being and becoming, and so on) but
involves the psychological paradox suggested by Zarathustra's animals when they say that
Zarathustra would say (on the point of death), "I spoke my teaching, I broke of my teaching."
The thought of the recurrence is "abysmal" for many reasons, but among them is its
incompatibility with any thought of a self or soul with continuous identity and freedom. This
dissolution of the self-consequent on the thought of recurrence is dramatized in Part IV, where
Zarathustra is continually splitting from fragments of himself (not only the higher men, but his
own animals whom he must desert by a ruse at the beginning of that part). One might reach a
similar perspective by meditating on Zarathustra's often-intoned "man is something that must be
overcome." Alderman's emphasis on the integrity of the self is closely connected with the
priority he ascribes to voice, as in the "spoke" of the book's title. But the subtitle "A Book for All

and None" implies that voice must be qualified or characterized by writing. Nietzsche's own
privileged literary categories for his writing are not only those used by Alderman—voice,
comedy, drama—but text and interpretation, manuscript and emendation. One indication of this
switch of critical categories: almost everywhere that Alderman sees drama, one might just as
well see narrative. Similarly, Alderman's relatively uncritical adoption of the literary critic's
quest for an "overall Gestalt" (p. 15) could be countered by an emphasis on the ambiguity and
fragmentation of the text. As Derrida has suggested, there is an intimate link in Nietzsche
between the idea of writing as always referring back to an earlier writing and the suggestion that
the self is to be conceived as a rhythm in a complex series of signs rather than as a center of
intelligibility. Even though my own inclination would be to develop the latter suggestions,
Alderman's book is consistently interesting and offers one of the only sustained and plausible
poetic and rhetorical readings of Nietzsche.
University of Kansas, Gary Shapiro

